With the 2010 World Cup in South Africa kicking off last week, there is much hope and excitement not only in Africa, but in the world. This is the first time that the football World Cup is being hosted on the African continent, a land that is football crazed to the highest degree! However, how are we to look at the World Cup and its effects on South Africa and the African continent as a whole, outside of the football analyses? Indeed questions relating to Argentina’s Lionel Messi’s brilliance or England’s chances of winning, to how far Bafana Bafana or any other African country for that matter gets in the tournament are indeed admirable queries! But the subject of today’s engagement shall be a general overview on the economic, social, and political ripples the splash of the World Cup 2010 will have on South Africa. In conclusion, I will attempt to as usual put this event in a wider African and global perspective to provide a larger context for this event.

To state the obvious, the 2010 World Cup has placed South African for the past few weeks and next month under the spotlight of the world. Football is the most popular sport in the world and it being the first time this event will be held on African soil, there will be much attention paid to the host nation. This attention will and is generating large amounts of revenue for South Africa as ticket sales, flight purchases, and hotel bookings have skyrocketed in the build up to the 2010 World Cup. These initial increases in revenue will have secondary effects on many other commercial and industrial ventures in South Africa. Many of the spectators of the games will wish to enjoy the pleasures of South Africa and spend heavily on various goods and services in South Africa. Hopefully, this can provide employment for the millions of South Africans who remain unemployed and help generate income for poor families who own small businesses which will enable them to send their children to school and generally increase their standard of living.

However, there is also a high cost to the hosting of the World Cup to South Africa. The construction of the new stadiums and other associated infrastructure has placed a heavy strain on the already fragile South African economy. South Africa hit hard by the 2008 financial crisis in more ways than most other African countries. To begin with, they were more intimately involved in the international financial markets in comparison to other African countries and experienced economic shrinkages similar to the developed countries. To compound this, South Africa also was negatively affected by the decrease in global demand for South African raw materials (diamonds, gold, silver, etc) and tourism; both large contributors to the South African economy. South Africa has only recently began recovering from this financial crisis and the costs of all the new infrastructure required to host a successful World Cup pushed South Africa, unknowingly to many, very hard. Furthermore, the question still remains what happens to all these new stadiums and additional hotels and other venues once the World Cup is over? The newly build stadiums were expensive in their construction and will require large allocations of resources to maintain. Is South Africa ready for this? Just recently a campaign started in Chicago campaigning against the Winter Olympics being held there. It was argued that the costs of hosting this event would far outstrip the benefits and many believe this is one of the reasons why it was eventually not chosen as the sight to host this event.

Socially, the increased spotlight on South Africa due to the 2010 World Cup has allowed much of its history to be shared with the rest of the world. For decades black South Africans suffered immensely under the oppressive regime that was Apartheid. Roughly, eight months ago, Morgan Freeman starred as Nelson Mandela in the blockbuster film Invictus that talked about South Africa’s hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup. It is an incredible story of the struggles of uniting a country so long divided by color with blacks made to be menial laborers and servants in their own country. This history has been exposed again to the world sixteen years after the ending of Apartheid and has highlighted many of the unsung heroes of this fight for freedom. Additionally, South Africa, like any other country, is rich in culture and tradition and the World Cup is a venue for South Africans to show off the richness of their diversity. By doing so, many of the ethnic rivalries and racial divisions I believe can be improved upon as South Africans together come together to show the world who and what they are through dance, song, and celebration. This gives the world a chance to learn about a people different from them and can only enrich the knowledge and love human beings can have for each other.

However, there are also problems with the increased exposure. Although South Africa is a natural resource wealthy country with high levels of economic growth, there are still vast inequalities between the wealthy and poor. South still has around a 30% unemployment rate, with roughly 40% of its people still living under the poverty line in conditions similar to and in some cases worse than what they experienced during Apartheid. Whites still control ¾ of the wealth in the private sector although black South Africans do still control the government. This is shocking to many and increases the criticism of the ruling ANC in their effectiveness to deliver on their promises to uplift South Africans out of poverty at independence. Additionally, HIV/AIDS has hit South Africa harder than most and it has for the past decade sported the high death rates in this category and this also is something that will possibly bring negative media to the ruling party ANC and the wider South African society.

Politically, South African politicians can reassert that the country they represent is the crown jewel of Africa internationally recognized by the world. Furthermore, with this international event being hosted by South Africa, it solidifies it as the regional hegemony. This is not to say that the international community ever doubted this fact but South African politicians have much to be proud of. There have been peaceful elections in South Africa since independence in 1994. Although some may comment on the fact that the ruling ANC party has stayed in control of government, with exception of this last election, with a 2/3 majority, there have been three different Presidents at the helm: Mandela (1994-1999), Mbeki (1999-2007), and now Zuma (2008-present). Each has brought something different to South Africa and does highlight the diversity of even political viewpoints and frameworks that exist within the ANC. Additionally, all the previous mentioned benefits are good for politics because it further legitimizes the successes of ANC rule in South Africa.

However, many of the negatives that will come out of the 2010 World Cup will also be used to discredit the ANC and its policies. Many South Africans as was stated above are still living in abject poverty and have indeed grown disillusioned with the ANC rhetoric. How will the ANC respond to these criticisms which have already begun filtering in? How will the ANC respond if the economic growth that the World Cup supposedly was to bring does not succeed and now questions get asked how can the government spend billions on stadiums and other supporting infrastructures when there are millions of South Africans struggling to find housing, eat healthily, and live in safety?

All in all, the 2010 World Cup in my opinion is a great honor and opportunity for the host nation. Hopefully more positive than negative will come out of this and increased development will be triggered not just in South Africa but in Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the other Southern African Development Community (SADC) states. African unity is ever the goal in my writings so I wish that this event is used to bring Africans closer together to be one of the small stepping stones to building a greater African union.

Beginning of a second empire and the end of Samori, 1892-1900. In the beginning of 1895, Samori again encountered the French but was able to defeat them. He pushed on, despite this further setback, and continued on to conquer the Abron (Gyaman) kingdom and western Gonja. “By this time, he (Samori) had succeeded in creating a new empire in the hinterland of the Ivory Coast and Asante” (Ranger, 1985). However, moving eastward put him into direct opposition with the British. Samori ordered his son, Sarankenyi-Mori to take a contingent of men and engage the British. In this first battle, Samori’s forces defeated the British contingent and were able to secure his flank. At the same time, Samori attacked and conquered Kong in May 1897 in an attempt to establish a base for his new empire. He initially succeeded and founded his new capital of Dabakala in the territory that he just conquered. However, with his continued expansion into the Bobo areas (modern day Burkina Faso), he encountered another French column, and this time he was in trouble. Overextended and surrounded by both the British and French armies, Samori was trapped. In a last ditch attempt to turn the Europeans against one another, he surrendered the territory of Bouna, which was coveted by the French, and again retreated. This was done because he knew that both the British and the French wanted this territory and he believed that ceding it to the French would pit them against the British. Believing this would buy him some time, he again retreated further north to his Toma allies, but on the way, he was captured in a surprise attack at Guelemou by a young French sergeant named Gourand on 29 September 1898. He was deported to Gabon were he died two years later in 1900.

Conclusion. And so ended the empire of Samori Toure. France and Britain divided up West Africa into their own spheres of influence and crushed any and all opposition to their rule. While Britain exerted more of an influence in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana, France was left with the bulk of Samori’s empire through its control of Mali, Niger, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Colonization was to continue in the Sudan for the next seventy years and in that time the stories of hero’s like Samori Toure still stayed strong.

However, although Samori Toure, like Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama in Namibia, Shaka Zulu of the Zulu in South Africa and Bai Bureh of Kasseh people of Sierra Leone, were eventually defeated by the European powers, they achieved something very important. They showed the European colonial powers that Africans would resist their colonial influence forever. This was important because colonies are not suppose to be much trouble in terms of management and these revolts were signals that sooner or later, the costs to the Europeans of staying in Africa would be higher than any benefits they could obtain. The importance of leaders like Samori Toure can only be seen if one understands the context of the times that he was living in. If we take a step back and look at what was happening all over the African continent during his resistance of the French we can see that people were fighting against colonial rule everywhere. What we see is Africans fighting European oppression and many times nearly succeeding.

In addition to the context of the times, we must understand the influence of Samori years after his death. When Guinea gained its independence in 1958, Sekou Toure, the Presidential hopeful, used his familial relation to Samori as a justification of his Presidency. Even after fifty eight years of being dead, what Samori meant to the people of Guinea was still strong. Samori’s fight against the French and British colonial powers was proof to Africans that we could be strong without Europeans and that fighting for freedom from European rule was better than surrender. This sentiment was echoed by Sekou Toure when he told the French President, De Gaulle, that "We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery." These words mark one of the greatest moments of Sekou Toure’s presidency and set the tone for how he would act from then on.

Through this, the spirit of Pan-Africanism was enhanced and with leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyrere, Sekou Toure spreading this idea of freedom from European oppression across Africa. Freedom, defiance, and strength were the core emotions that Samori inspired in these great leaders as well as other less known people and has given Africans a strong pride in being African. Is this enough to bring us Africans together as a single state? I am not sure, but what I do know is that there is something special and powerful about being African that makes us all smile with pride even when reading other tribes and peoples’ history.

Bibliography

Encyclopedias

1. Appiah, Kwame A., and Henry L. Gates, Jr., eds. "French Colonization." Africana. 2nd ed. 5 vols. New York, NY: Oxford UP, Inc., 2005.

2. Jansen, Jan. "Toure, Samori and His Empire." Encyclopedia of African History. Ed. Kevin Shillington. 1st ed. 3 vols. New York, NY: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005.

3. Appiah, Kwame A., and Henry L. Gates, Jr., eds. "Colonization." Africana, Vol 3. 2nd ed. 5 vols. New York, NY: Oxford UP, Inc., 2005.

4. Handloff, Robert E., comp. Cote D'Ivoire: a Country Study. 3rd ed. Vol. 1. Library of Congress, 1991. 10.

Individual Books

1. Davidson, Basil. The African Past. 1st. London, England: Lowe and Brydone Ltd, 1964. (Davidson 268)

2. Klein, Martin. Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa. 1st. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Klein 52-53)

3. Buell, Raymond L.. The Native Problem in Africa. New York, USA: J.J. Little and Ives Company, 1928.

Books/Encyclopedia’s with Contributions from many Authors

1. Ranger, T.O. "African initiatives and resistance in the face of partition and conquest.” Africa under Colonial domination 1880-1935. 1st. 1985.

2. Boahen, A. Adu. "New trends and processes in Africa in the nineteenth century.” Africa in the Nineteenth Century. 1st ed.. 1989.

3. Person, Y.. "States and peoples of Senegambia and Upper Guinea.” Africa in the 19th century until the 1880s. 1st. 1989

4. Ajayi, J.F.A.. "Conclusion: Africa on the eve of the European conquest.” Africa in the 19th century to the 1880's. 1st. 1989

5. Levtzion and Pouwels, "Introduction: Patterns of Islamization and Varieties of Religious Experience among Muslims of Africa."The History of Islam in Africa. 1st. 2000.

6. Wilks, Ivor. "The Juula and the Expansion of Islam into the Forrest.” The History of Islam in Africa. 1st. 2000.

War with the French Part I, 1881-1892. When the French came into direct contact with Samori in 1881, they were dealing with a sophisticated empire at the peak of its power. Unlike Tukulor, which was on the decline, Samori’s empire was flowing with confidence from its recent victories and hungry for more. At this point, it would be helpful to break down the structure of Samori’s army in order to understand exactly what kind of mechanism the French were dealing with.

Samori’s army was composed of two important sections. There was the infantry, the sofa, which by 1887 numbered anywhere between 30,000 and 35,000 troops (Ranger, 1985). Then there was the cavalry section that, even at its peak, numbered no more than 3,000 troops. To quote T.O. Ranger, “The infantry was divided into permanent units of ten to twenty men known as the se (feet) or kulu (heaps) commanded by a kuntigi (chief), and ten se formed a bolo (arm) under the command of a bolokuntigi. The cavalry was divided into a band of fifty called sere” (Ranger, 1985; pg. 123). During battle, the bolo formed the main striking force while sere rode on each side of the bolo. These units were permanent, so, over time, they developed a kinship and loyalty to each other that broke down many of the cultural and ethnic barriers that existed between them (Ranger, 1985). But through it all, they were loyal to Samori and attained, as Ranger calls it, “a quasi-national character because it achieved a very remarkable homogeneity” (Ranger, 1985; pg. 123). What made this fighting force different from other armies was that it was equipped with modern weapons provided by Samori. For a while, he was able to equip his army himself and repair damaged weapons himself without the Europeans. This was very important because this placed Samori as technologically equal to the French, for a time, and allowed him to face the French armies on equal terms.

Around 1876, Samori was forced to import modern weapons from the British and introduced the “Gras rifles with lighter cartridges, and Kropatscheks which were repeater rifles” (Ranger, 1985; pg. 123). Once he received these guns, Samori immediately set out to copy their design. However, a large handicap of Samori’s army was the lack of artillery. This hampered his effectiveness in fighting the French because the French owned artillery and facing them in open battle would result in heavy losses to Samori’s army. Furthermore, because he had no artillery, it would be very hard for Samori to attack French forts and permanent structures built from stone and defended by artillery. What this did was restrict him primarily to guerilla warfare as a way of fighting the French (Ranger, 1985). His troops did know the land better than the French, and using his cavalry as his main weapon, he could strike quickly, cause serious damage and confusion, and then swiftly retreat with minimal casualties.

In order to pay for these weapons, Samori sold ivory and gold, from the goldfields of Bure, to the British. He also sold slaves for horses for his cavalry. In order to fund his growing army with modernized weapons, Samori Toure had to engage in the selling of slaves. He did not have gold and ivory in the quantities needed to purchase the amount of weapons that his army required. And although he had access to kola from the forest and salt from the Sahara, it still was not enough to obtain the weapons (Klein, 1998). Samori did have large rubber resources, but at this time, they were not as profitable as they would be at a later date. So, Samori turned to the slave trade as another means of obtaining modern weaponry and horses, and even though the Atlantic slave trade was on the decline, Samori still sold a lot of the people he conquered to slavers and he was known to have sent caravans full of hundreds of slaves to the north of his territory, probably to Berber or Tuareg slavers in exchange for horses.(Klein, 1998).

Despite his efforts, Samori was only able to equip at best 6,000 of his 35,000-man army with modern guns and horse 2,000 men. In addition to all of this technology, Samori’s army was very well trained and disciplined and benefited from being under the leadership of one of the foremost tacticians of the time, Samori himself.

Samori first came into contact with the French in 1882. This occurred because his expansion to the Mandingo areas was perceived, and rightly so, as a threat to the French. Both empires were expanding, and it was only a matter of time before they clashed with each other. The French sent Lieutenant Alakamessa to Samori with an order to leave the area that he was now expanding into. Naturally, Samori ignored the “command”. In response to Samori’s defiance, the French launched a surprise attack on his forces and he was forced to retreat. In retaliation Samori ordered his younger brother, Keme-Brema to counter attack. The attack by Samori’s army on the French came near the Malian capital of Bamako on April 2, 1882. Keme-Brema defeated the French forces there, but, ten days later, a much smaller French force armed with the latest weaponry and possessing the all-important artillery pushed them back.

It was this defeat and the subsequent capture of his main source of gold at the Bure goldfields that finally convinced Samori that the French were a real challenge to his power. This is ironic because both empires were so arrogant and confident in their abilities they underestimated each other. After their initial conflicts, this would cease to be the case as each empire respected the other’s fighting capabilities.

Determined not to underestimate the French again, Samori quickly amassed three large armies: his own, those of this brother Keme, and those of Masara-Mamadi. In a brilliantly organized and executed battle, they dislodged the French from Bure and regained control of the goldfields (Ranger, 1985). Another sign of Samori’s realization that the French were a very powerful rival to him was his subsequent reliance on diplomacy. Samori understood that warfare in of itself would not defeat the French, but if he could possibly involve the British in the conflict, perhaps he could use their intense rivalry to his advantage. So, one year prior to his defeat of the French at Bure, after his conquest of Falaba, Samori send an emissary to the British governor of Freetown to propose the idea that he places his empire under the protection of the British (Ranger, 1985). In reality, Samori had no intention of complying with this, but he understood the politics and rivalries between the French and the British and did this in order to gain some British sympathy as well as to disequilibrize the French.

Unfortunately, the British also perceived Samori as a threat and the loyalty amongst the colonial powers proved the stronger and they denied his request. In reaction to this, he signed a treaty with the French on 28 March, 1886, in which he agreed to withdraw his troops to the right bank of the Niger (Ranger, 1985). However, in exchange for this concession, he retained ownership of Bure and the Mandingo of Kangaba. One year later, Samori signed another treaty with the French that ceded the left bank of the river to the French and would place his empire under French control (Buell, Raymond L. “The Native Problem in Africa; 1914). This was again Samori using his diplomacy because he hoped that this treaty would ensure the help of the French against Tieba and buy Samori time to reorganize his army to counter the French. The French signed the treaty primarily to block Samori allying with Mamadou Lamine, who the French were at war with. It is evident that these treaties were not meant to be honored and were useful only in the fact that they called a truce to the fighting, which allowed both empires to consolidate their power (Ranger, 1985).

After signing this second treaty with the French, Samori attacked the Faama of Sikasso, with a 12,000 troop strong force. He did this probably to secure his supply and trading routes with the British and to ensure that while he was fighting the French, certain kingdoms did not rise up against him.

Furthermore, this treaty with the French bought Samori time to consolidate his control over the northern areas of what is now the Ivory Coast. The small Juula communities in Jamala and Jimini, easily fell under his control as his powerful army swept through their lands. It was here, were Samori claimed the title of amir al-mu’minin, commander of the faithful. Through Samori’s control, these communities were united for the first time under a singular and universal political authority (Wilks, 2000).

In addition to this, Samori opened many Mosques and schools in these conquered areas and for the first time introduced Islamic law (Wilks, 2000). As mentioned before, it is very hard to find a consistent pattern to Samori’s use of Islam in his empire. In the areas of his empire in Guinea and southern Mali, not much mention is made of his spreading of Islam but when the Ivory Coast is discussed, we see it become more and more of an issue.

Samori’s reforms were not popular with everybody, and perceiving these changes as threats to the Juula way of life, Buna, a small Juula community, balked. Samori could not afford this and moved quickly to crush Buna. In addition to conquering Buna, he executed the Imam, Sa’id Sissay for allegedly supporting the Buna mansa, a pagan, who opposed Samori (Wilks, 2000). A few months later, Samori sacked Kong and executed forty senior ulmana members. This was done for two reasons; firstly, Samori had heard that these men and Kong had disapproved of his new reforms. Secondly, he discovered that the Juula were in communication in the French, and this was seen as treason (Wilks, 2000).

However, while Samori was doing this, he realized that the French were only making peace with him to prevent him from obtaining weapons from Sierra Leone, so he stopped his war with Tieba and mobilized his army for complete war against the French. Samori moved quickly and expeditiously. He reorganized his army, settled once and for all a treaty with the British that allowed him to buy modern guns for three years in large quantities, and began training his already veteran troops in the European style of warfare (Ranger, 1985). Samori also concluded that the best way to defeat the French, owing from his earlier experiences, was to adopt defensive tactics and use mobility as the way to fight. What this entailed was in effect guerilla warfare as Samori wished to use hit and run tactics to fight the French (Ranger, 1985). In 1891, the French commander Archinard attacked Samori in the belief that Samori’s empire would collapse after an attack. Although Archinard did indeed capture Kankan on April 7 1891 and burned Bissandugu later on, it did not result in what he wished.

Louis Archinard was appointed Supreme Commander of the French forces in the Sudan in the latter parts of the 1880’s and proved to be an able, if extremely arrogant, commander. It was he who conquered most of French Sudan, and his success, unlike some of his other officers, was fueled by his hunger for advancement (Klein, 1998). He believed that the best way to attain the promotions and advancements that he desired was through military conquests. It is important to note that France was not unified regarding their presence in the Sudan. There were many parties in the French parliament that did not like how involved France was with all the wars and conflicts in the region. They ordered the French high command to control France’s advances into the Sudan, but, many times, Archinard disobeyed orders to not attack West African forces or convinced his superiors to allow him to continue with his conquests (Klein, 1998).

Back to the story at hand, although Archinard had sacked Bissandugu, Samori perceived the sack of his city and had already evacuated the city and regrouped his forces. Samori attacked the unsuspecting French at Dabadugu on Sept. 3 1891 and defeated them. Soon after this defeat, Humbert replaced Archinard as commander of the French forces in the Sudan. Determined to destroy Samori, Humbert attacked Samori’s army in January 1892 with around 1,300 veteran troops and 3,000 porters. This was a very important battle because if Samori were to lose, his empire in this part of West Africa would fall. Realizing the importance of the battle, Samori personally took command of 2,500 specially chosen soldiers and attacked the French first (Ranger, 1985). Samori’s troops fought valiantly and bravely and inflicted heavy losses on the French but were ultimately defeated. Samori was forced to withdraw, and the French gained control over Bissandugu, Sanankoro, and Kerwane, the core areas of Samori’s empire.

Samori was now left with two options; he could either surrender to the French or retreat in hopes of building a new empire far away from the reach of the French. He chose to retreat to the east, to the areas of the northern Ivory Coast that were still under his control but were far away from his homeland. With his scorched-earth policy still in effect, Samori continued his move eastwards towards the Bandama and Comoe rivers. Samori used this strategy in his retreat because he was determined to leave behind as little as possible for the French, and although many villages and people suffered because of it, it did hurt the French. However by retreating so far to the east, Samori lost control of his last weapon supply route as the French advanced into their new territory.

Early Life, 1830-1861. Resources about Samori’s early life are very hard to find, and lot about his past is covered with legend and mystery. However, there seems to be a general consensus that Samori was born in 1830 in the area of Konyan, which lies near the upper Milo valley on the border with Toron. The village in which he was born was called Sanankaro and lies to the south-east of Kankan in present day Guinea. Apparently, his ancestors were Muslim peddlers from the Kankan, probably Juula, but he grew up in an area that was very traditionalist and religious, not Muslim, so it is very likely that he would have spoken about his ancestors being Kamara or Konate, traditionalist peasants (Klein, 1998). The area in which Samori was born shared the traditions of the ancient Empire of Mali founded by Sundjata (Klein, 1998). However, when Samori was growing up, this area was no longer a powerful unified empire but a bunch of small separate states called kafu. During Samori’s time, and a few generations before, military leaders began merging these small kafu into larger and larger political units that were founded by trade and warfare. Yves Person refers to this as the “juula revolution” as it created new forms of political and military organization.

The word juula is a Mande word that means “merchant” (Encyclopedia of African History). This word is generally used to describe the trading class of people that sprung up throughout the former area of Mande culture and influence. This class of merchants started forming under the empire of Mali and, being very good at trade, they built up a strong economic base that gave them a certain amount of influence in the empire. The Juula were Muslim, converted as early as in the eleventh century, by Berber and Arab merchants. Their practice of Islam was very tolerant of the local traditions and cultures. Therefore, they served at times as soothsayers, advisors, and priests.

Being born into a juula family, it was only natural that Samori start out his career as a juula trader. But, according to Person, Samori became a trader in order to escape his father’s authority and then joined the Sesse as a warrior in order to free his enslaved mother (Person, 1989). He offered his services as a slave to her master in order to win her freedom and quickly established himself as an exceptional military tactician. Over time, he was given larger forces to command. When Samori lost favor with the Madina, the Berete, those who captured his mother, called upon his talents in war. Because of Samori’s great successes in battle, he was able to convince his master to allow him authority over his particular kafu. This freed him from the services of the Berete and allowed him to begin building his empire.

As leader of his kafu, Samori wooed the traditionalists inhabiting the lower Toron, his mother’s people, who were worried about the rising Muslim empires all around them. They felt they needed Samori’s brilliant military mind in order to fight off the enemies surrounding them, and in exchange for protecting them, they would accept Samori’s rule. Under Samori’s unique style of leadership, he opened the trade routes that were created by the Juula and used them not only for the flow of commerce but also for his army to outmaneuver enemies if and when they were attacked. Also, he emancipated the Juula Muslims while simultaneously keeping the balance between them and the traditionalists (Person, 1989). This rallied a lot of people behind Samori and helped fuel the expansion of his empire from 1871-1881.

Rise of an empire, 1871-1882. Being supported by the majority of the Kamara and suppressing all opposition, he established his first base at Sanankoro, which made him master of the upper Milo. The Sise, a powerful kingdom, who after seeing Samori’s success grew wary but did initially accept his leadership over these territories. After destroying the Berete, Sere-Brema, a neighboring kingdom began to take notice of him. In order to avoid a battle he knew he was not ready for, Samori retreated to the forests of the Toma to regroup.

In 1867, Samori returned with fresh troops and attacked the Sise. He timed his attack masterfully because the Sise were locked in a costly war with the Ture in Wasulu and was vulnerable (Person, 1989). Following his victory, Samori again reorganized his army and decided to abandon upper Konyan to the traditionalists, who he claimed he would not fight because they were his kin. In a sense, this further legitimated Samori’s authority because he had fulfilled his promise to protect his people from their aggressive neighbors, and now he was granting them the freedom they desired.

In 1871, Samori marched his army north and fought and defeated the local traditionalists, the Nantenen-Famudu. (Person, 1989) Nantenen-Famudu was the local hegemony and by conquering them, Samori took the first official step in forging his new empire. It was here that Samori set up his new capital of Bissandugu. This was a statement that he was creating his own empire independent of his homeland and familial relations. His Sise rivals wisely chose not to react to this as they were not strong enough to oppose Samori’s bold move. Samori then formed an alliance with Kankan, apparently in the name of Islam, and resumed the rich trade that had once flowed between them prior to war. In addition, Samori also ensured that he retained authority over all of the defeated peoples in his new territory. With this move, Samori was now the unquestioned ruler of an area that was larger than that of his neighbors. However, the management of an area this large required good organization, and in order to better organize his empire, Samori adopted the model used in Tukuloor (Person, 1989). Nevertheless, this rapid expansion left Samori vulnerable, and the Sise recognized Samori’s weakness, sensing that the time was right to attack. In 1878, the large army of the Sise attacked Samori’s freshly formed empire and succeeded in pushing Samori out of Sankaran. Sensing their tactical advantage, the Sise attacked further in hopes of conquering west as far as Sierra Leone with the bold idea of surrounding Samori’s scattered forces. If they could achieve this, they could crush Samori and forever eliminate this rising new empire that threatened their hegemony in the region.

Person writes very descriptively of this war and it is from his work that most of the knowledge of this battle is known. With Samori seemingly beaten back and close to defeat by the Sise, Kankan, with Tukuloor egging them on, broke away from Samori’s empire. Realizing that the empire that he had worked so hard to build was on the verge of complete annihilation, Samori knew that he was in trouble. Samori again amassed his armies and did something that many military experts say should never be done; he simultaneously attacked his Muslim neighbors. Fighting a war on two fronts, with his empire already under siege, was risky because Samori’s forces were spread thin while his enemies’ forces were thickly concentrated. Samori’s army did not outnumber his enemies’ at all but what made the difference in this war was the fact that Samori was Samori. In two outstanding military campaigns, December 1879 and April 1881, Samori attacked his enemies’ forces and smashed both the armies of Kankan and Sise. The Sise became prisoners, and Madina was destroyed. Its inhabitants were sent to Bissandugu, his capital. Although Kankan did not immediately come back to Samori’s empire, they eventually did. A little while later, the rich territory of Odienne joined Samori, which opened a route to further expansion in the Ivory Coast. By 1881, Samori’s empire was the supreme power in the savannahs of the Sudan, and in the wake of the decline of Tukulor, Samori’s empire reigned supreme. Samori had accomplished a drastic change in Mandika society but had not destroyed it, and although he elevated the status of the Muslim traders in his empire, the traditionalists were still free.

At this point, in 1881, Samori was in control of 20,000 square kilometers of land and ruled over approximately 75,000 people. Samori’s empire stretched over parts of modern-day Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Even though Samori’s empire was called Maninka, there was no ethnic group that formed the core of the empire. It did indeed take some ideological inspiration from ancient Mali, but Samori imprinted his own style of leadership and governance on the Maninka Empire that made it truly unique. What made Samori’s empire different from others previously formed and some of those at the time were that it represented a change in West African governance. According to A. Adu Boahen, “Samori Toure is a good example of a change in West African governance during the 19th century to more centralized art of governance” (Boahen, 1989; pg. 12)

This can be interpreted to mean that, like the kingdom of Dahomey, the King or ruler was the ultimate authority in the state. Although he might have had a council of elders or prominent members of society advising him, all power rested with the ruler. Unlike Asante, Benin, Oyo and other states, were power was more equally distributed amongst councils and rulers, Samori’s empire started and ended with him.

In order to better control and monitor his recently conquered people, Samori set up puppet rulers in the different areas of his empire to ensure the loyalty of the people in each area (Jansen, 2005). In addition to this, Samori further ensured the loyalty of his puppet rulers by taking the sons of these rulers and enlisting them into his army. Samori also built structures called tata (basically a fortress) close to the political centers of his tributary kingdoms in order to keep a close eye on his allies.

While officially Samori adopted the Islamic title of almami in 1884, it is important to note that from 1880-81 this new empire was run by an “Islamized military class” (Person, 1989). Although this was the case, Samori’s empire could not be called an Islamic state.

The question on whether Samori was Muslim or not is something that is hotly debated by West African historians. Some say that Samori only used Islam as a means to unite more people to his empire; others say he wanted to be a Muslim but didn’t know Arabic or the Koran, and other say that he was a devout Muslim who was crucial in spreading the word of Allah across his empire. Suffice to say, after Samori comes into contact with the French, he uses Islam more and more and as he is pushed by the French to northern Ivory Coast. It is at this point that there is really no doubt that he was a practicing Muslim and was using it as a means to rally support against the French. We must remember, Samori was a Juula and the Juula were Muslim, but they were not as fanatical as others were.

(Within the next few days i will post the third installment of this series which will cover Samori's resistance of the French)

Introduction: In today’s world, Africa no longer finds itself to be a great power. Through the exploitation of our nations by the west and the poor leadership of our governments, Africa has become dependent on the west for survival. Gone are the days when Sundjiata Keita forged the great empire of Mali, no longer are the Sudanic states the center of world trade, and an end has come to leaders like Shaka Zulu, Hendrik Witbooi, and Samori Toure, who struck fear into the hearts of the Europeans in Africa. Today, African countries all fall into the bracket of Third World countries with, in many cases, rampid starvation and malnutrition, high poverty rates, and unacceptably high infant mortality rates. The civil wars that have racked Africa since the end of colonialism have generally been in response to people feeling that there is no hope. But there is something that gives many people living in Africa hope—the stories of great empires and leaders of the past. In this essay, I would like to focus on Samori Toure, who forged an empire from the scattered Malinke peoples living in the area that encompasses parts of the modern day Northern Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Southern Mali.

But what is the significance of a leader like Samori Toure? He was indeed a cold-hearted dictator who executed hundreds if not thousands of his own people. Samori Toure did not believe in freedom of speech, expression, and, in general, the questioning of his will. In his quest to modernize his army, he raided villages and sold his enemies to the Europeans as slaves. Fighting against the French, he was not really fighting for Africans and/or the Malinke people; he was indeed fighting for the preservation of his throne and thus his power. Samori believed in Samori and did not fight for the honor of the Malinke peoples or for the oppressed peoples of West Africa as others did. But all of this is irrelevant to the many West Africans who know and hear his story. In the times in which we are living, it gives us Africans joy and hope to hear about an African leader who put fear in the heart of the Europeans, who now exploit us. In fact, Sekou Toure, the first president of Guinea, used his relation to Samori Toure to legitimate himself as a suitable president for the newly independent colony.

Samori Toure was important because he was an African leader who defeated the European colonial masters on numerous occasions before his capture. He was a master of military tactics and brilliantly organized the empire that he controlled. But more than anything else, he was, and is, a symbol. He is a symbol of defiance and strength in the face of overwhelming odds. Overwhelming odds that many African peoples find themselves in today in the face of modern day colonialism and exploitation.

Throughout colonialism and post-colonialism, Africa’s colonial masters made great efforts to hide the exploits of many of our leaders from us. African children were taught that they were monkeys with inferior intelligence to whites and that all of our great leaders such as Samori were just ruthless savages. As the renowned African historian Basil Davidson notes, “Men like al Hajj Umar appear in the European story as nothing more than wild fanatics or frantic nuisances; leaders like Samory as bloodthirsty bandits or mere adventurers. In truth, these men responded, as outstanding leaders always will, to the most profound movements of social need and thought of their time” (Davidson, 1964; pg. 268). The important part of this statement is the latter part which states that men like Samori were “outstanding leaders and responded to the social needs and thoughts of their time.” Understanding this is critical because it casts our African leaders as influential individuals, independent of Europeans. Through portions of our post-colonial history, it was still taught that the only way that an African leader was great or worthy of mention was in relation to the Europeans. So, if one was a leader like Hermanus Van Wyk, who betrayed the Nama and Herero of Namibia to the Germans, he would be portrayed as a visionary who saw the future better than the others.

Samori was a great leader in and of himself, and his opposition of and resistance to European rule enhanced this status. Furthermore, much that is said about him from some sources just does not take into consideration the context of the place and times that he was living in. The truth of the matter is, most, if not all kings, princes, and leaders of African kingdoms and empire were dictators. There was no democracy or individualism floating around during that time. Samori was a leader similar to those of Asante, Tukolor, and Dahomey. Granted, each had their own radically different styles of governance based on the situations that each found themselves in, but they were all, for better or worse, emperors and kings. But, in my mind, Samori stands in a category of his own in terms of the West African leaders who opposed the French and British influence in the latter part of the 19th century.

So when we ask the question, “Why did these leaders continue their resistance of the Europeans knowing they were overmatched?” the best answer lies with the words of A. Adu Boahen when he writes, “the issue at stake was not short-term or long-term advantages but rather the fundamental question of his land and his sovereignty” (Boahen, 1985; pg.10) Many would rather have died in the defense of their sovereignty and independence, and either, to further quote Boahen, “chose to die on the battlefield, go into voluntary flight or face exile rather than surrender their sovereignty without a struggle” (Boahen, 1985; pg.11). It is this latter part that again is the main reason why Samori is so well remembered and should continue to be from an African perspective. He embodied exactly what Boahen talked about. He would never surrender his empire, as many leaders did throughout Africa, to the Europeans without a fight. It is this defiance that gives many Africans, especially our brothers in the west; hope that they were at one time something more than savages. We are strong and powerful and we need to take our lives into our own hands, like Samori did and create a better life for our children and us.

So what will follow will be a discussion on the biography of Samori Toure before 1861 followed by the beginnings of his empire from 1861 to 1882, when he first fought the French, ending with a discussion on his resistance to the French from 1882 to his capture in 1898. In conclusion, I would like re-emphasize his importance as a great leader and talk briefly about the effect that his and other resistance movements, had on the European will to continue their oppression of Africa.

(Part II shall follow tomorrow and will discuss the Early Life and Rise of an Empire in Samori Toure’s biography.)

Just today I read a BBC article (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8233957.stm) in which it has been reported that Israel’s right wing Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, is set to conduct a goodwill tour of the African continent. This is an opportunity for the African continent to show solidarity with the oppressed people of Palestine. We need to either not admit this man into our countries or tell him in no uncertain terms that we consider his government another form of Apartheid and as Africans who have suffered under that for years, we want nothing to do with him.

My brothers and sisters of the continent, I just returned last month from a two week internship in Palestine where our delegation travelled around the country and spoke to people on both sides of the conflict in order to get a better appreciation of the situation. There is no doubt in my mind, based off of the evidence in the news/histories and realities on the ground that the Israeli government is a racist, oppressive, Apartheid regime that suppresses innocent people. What is happening to the Palestinians there is criminal and can be described as a mixture of what the white settlers did to the Native Americans, what whites in America did to blacks in America after the Civil War, what colonial powers did to us, and what white South Africans did to black Namibians and South Africans. That is a frightening mix of monstrous oppressions and I can assure you I don’t exaggerate.

The Israelis claim that they come to Africa to promote better business relations and to help combat the Iranian influence on the continent. Let us be frank, this is not their intention. We as Africans have always, through excellent voting in the UN General Assembly, fought for the rights of the Palestinian people by supporting the PLO’s initiatives. We have voted against Israel numerous times and this has indeed prevented them from using the UN and International Law to support their illegal occupation of Palestine. This trip’s intention is to attempt to convince Africa that Israel is an ally and stop the pressure we have heaped against them in the international community.

Israel is desperate for the world to recognize it as legitimate and this trip is designed to get us to support them and their suppression of the Palestinians. Let us be clear about that and not live under any illusions, they are our enemies and have acted so historically and are no different now.

During SWAPO and the ANC’s fight against the Apartheid South African government, Israeli was one of this government’s strongest allies. In the UN General Assembly it was the Israeli government along with the Portuguese and a few other governments that always voted against UN resolutions calling for free and fair elections in Namibia and South Africa. Throughout the fight for independence of both countries Israel trained numerous Apartheid South African soldiers and equipped them with the weapons they would use to kill SWAPO, MPLA, Cuban, and ANC freedom fighters.

These are the same people who now wish to come to Africa to help promote business ties. In one loud voice the people of the continent must tell this Apartheid government to leave and only when they have stopped their violations of International Law, crimes against humanity and given the Palestinian people their freedom will we even consider talking to them.

My brothers and sisters, the Palestinian people are losing this fight for freedom. The entire western world is in general ineffective when it comes to imposing harsh penalties on Israel for breaking previous peace agreements and not standing by current ones. There are many reasons for this but the most important of them is the fact Europe and the United States, Israel’s largest allies, have the Holocaust guilt (which they rightly deserve) and are reluctant to say or do anything against Israel. This is not a guilt that Africa, Asia, and Latin America share and because of that we must lead the charge for the international community when it comes to condemning this oppressive and evil regime. We must be the leaders of the world in this because we know so well what it feels like to be colonized and treated like animals in our own land. How can we now stand by and welcome the very same people who do the same to Palestinians and supported the most evil colonial regime in Africa in Apartheid South Africa?

The time has come for us to act and although we have our own serious problems to tackle, the least that we can and must do to help the Palestinians, is to not acknowledge the Israeli government as a government. We do not support Apartheid governments and this must be made clear to the Israeli Foreign Minister in no uncertain terms!

Of all of US foreign policy issues from 1945 to the present, one of the more interesting events to be analyzed is US involvement in Angola from 1970-2002 (2002 being the year of the death of Jonas Savimbi).

Since the early 1700’s, Portugal was in control of the resource-rich territory known as Angola. Their ruthless colonial rule lasted for approximately 400 years before Angolan independence was achieved in 1975. Throughout this immense time period, numerous liberation struggles were initiated and defeated. But in 1956, the PCA (Angolan Communist Party) and PLUA (Party for the United Struggle for Africans in Angola) merged to form the MPLA and 20 years later, they would be the party responsible for Angola’s freedom from Portuguese imperialism.

However, prior to independence, the MPLA was not the only organized military movement against Portuguese rule, UNITA (Movement for the Total Liberation of Angola) and FNLA were also popular movements formed in the 1950s trying to win independence from Angola. The MPLA was a multi-tribal Marxist-Leninist oriented group that had the tentative support of the Soviet Union and recognition from the OAU right before independence. The MPLA was widely acknowledged as the popular movement of the people. UNITA was backed initially by the Chinese and the US and later on by Apartheid South Africa and the US in their civil war against the MPLA. FNLA was backed by a bit of both but never reached the heights of either party and later on merged with the MPLA.

Angola was valuable to the Portuguese for many reasons but the most important being its natural resources and human labor. Angola was and still is rich in diamonds, gold, silver, copper and oil and it was this large oil wealth that attracted the attention of the US during the 70s.

From as early as the 1950s, Portugal has been struggling to maintain control over its colonies Angola and Mozambique. The MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA were very successful in fighting the Portuguese and had over time, gained considerable international support for their struggles. Portugal was in danger of losing this colony as the costs for maintaining it as well as fighting of local independence movements was becoming too high.

The United States, during the Nixon administration’s second term deemed it necessary to support the Portuguese in Angola with both military aid and business investment in their local oil and diamond industries. One of the results of this intervention was US businesses like Exxon Mobil and others made millions from the oil reserves and the US and Portugal made things smoother for diamond giant DeBeers to obtain diamonds. Portugal also provided the US and NATO with crucial international support against Franco of Spain which was deemed important by the western powers. In return for this co-operation, the Portuguese were given the military assistance needed to keep the local guerilla movements at bay

However, things changes drastically in 1974 when the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon overthrew the government of Portugal. The new government installed was one not disposed to the maintenance of expensive colonies. By this time, Portugal had over 40,000 troops in Angola and even with US support, the costs of keeping Angola as a colony was too high. The Portuguese departed almost overnight and the country was left with insufficient means for self-government.

After the Portuguese left, the three parties that fought for independence signed a tentative peace treaty and pledged to form an interim government in order to prepare the country for elections. Because the MPLA was the popular movement of Angola and in fact lead the struggle for independence, its President, Agostinho Neto became the first President of the country. Savimbi, leader of UNITA, rejected this and took up arms against the MPLA lead government and civil war broke out that would last 25 years. Savimbi was encouraged to take up arms against the MPLA because the CIA, with Bush Senior as Director, understood that the MPLA had the support of the Angolan people and would control government if it came to an election. Furthermore, the MPLA was influenced strongly by Marxist-Leninist ideals and having them in charge of government was seen as a threat to US interests in the region seeing as the Cold War was at its height.

As they did in the DRC and other places around the world, the US Executive tried everything to remove the party it did not support from power. However, Congress was initially not in support of involvement in Angola and passed the Clark Amendment which hampered the ability of the Executive Branch of government to carry out its policies. The Clark Amendment basically stated that it was illegal for the US to provide direct military/financial aid to anti-government forces. After the Vietnam war ended, Congress worried that the Execute would start another costly foreign war and passed this Amendment with the intention to keep the US out of other people’s wars. However, under pressure from President Gerald Ford, the Director of the CIA George Bush Sr, Dick Cheney, and Henry Kissinger, Congress was successfully lobbied to give support to UNITA. Their rational was that the MPLA was being directly aided by Moscow and this called for US intervention to prevent Soviet influence in Southern Africa. This was later proved to be untrue as the Soviets were very hesitant to give direct aid to Angola and Cuba only sent troops after the US began sending millions of dollars in military aid and advisors to Savimbi.

Initially though, the US had to use other channels to support UNITA and this took the form of them continuing support to Apartheid South Africa.